

PSC/IR 106: Week 5 Recitation

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Outline

1. Quiz on preventive war.
2. Preemptive war.
3. Peace through instability and fighting for survival.

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
Review

Why does shifting power trigger war?

1. Rising states start wars after they have become strong to steal stuff from the declining states.
2. Declining states choose to fight because they prefer a costly war today to an efficient but disadvantageous peace tomorrow.
3. Power shifts only cause problems when the rising state surpasses the declining state in strength.

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Critical Assumption

- The probability of victory remains constant regardless of who starts the war.
 - But first strike advantages exist: element of surprise, choice of where to fight.

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- The probability of victory remains constant regardless of who starts the war.
 - But first strike advantages exist: element of surprise, choice of where to fight.
- Do first strike advantages lead to war?
 - Yes, if they are sufficiently large.

The Model

- Suppose the states must choose whether to preempt or bargain.
 - If both preempt or both bargain (and bargaining fails), A wins with probability p_A .
 - If A preempts but B bargains, the states fight, and A wins with probability $p_A + \Delta_A$. ($1 - p_A + \Delta_B$ if B preempts and A bargains.)

The Modeling Question

- Suppose x is the outcome of bargaining. Does there exist an x such that the states individually prefer the bargained outcome to preemption?

A's Dilemma

- Assume the other guy wants to bargain.
- $Eu(\text{preempt}) = p_A - c_A + \Delta_A$
- $Eu(\text{bargain}) = x$
- Bargaining acceptable if:
 - $x \geq p_A - c_A + \Delta_A$


B's Dilemma

- Assume the other guy wants to bargain.
- $Eu(\text{preempt}) = 1 - p_A - c_B + \Delta_B$
- $Eu(\text{bargain}) = 1 - x$
- Bargaining acceptable if:
 - $1 - x \geq 1 - p_A - c_B + \Delta_B$
 - $x \leq p_A + c_B - \Delta_B$


Mutually Acceptable Bargains?

- $p_A - c_A + \Delta_A \leq x \leq p_A + c_B - \Delta_B$
- An x exists if:
 - $p_A - c_A + \Delta_A \leq p_A + c_B - \Delta_B$
 - $\Delta_A + \Delta_B \leq c_A + c_B$
 - That is, the first strike advantages are smaller than the costs of fighting.
- War if $\Delta_A + \Delta_B > c_A + c_B$


Bargaining Range



Bargaining Range




Bargaining Range



Settlements A Prefers



Settlements B Prefers



Settlements B Prefers

Settlements A Prefers



Important Note

- Preventive war \neq preemptive war.
 - What causes preventive war?

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 - What causes preventive war?
 - Long-term power shifts mean declining state prefers costly war today to disadvantageous peace tomorrow.
 - What causes preemptive war?
 - First-strike advantages induce states to cheat on peaceful agreements.

Important Note

- Commonalities: shifting power, commitment
 - Power shifts lead to war (long-term versus abrupt)
 - Better, peaceful agreements exist, but the parties cannot credibly commit to them.

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George W. Bush
democratically elected leader



George W. Bush
loser of the Iraq War



...spent the next four years chilling on
an 18 acre estate



...will spend the next few decades
chilling on a 1,583 acre estate



...and charges \$100,000+ for
appearance fees.



← will make appearances for substantially less, as long as food is involved: williamspaniel@gmail.com



Saddam Hussein
everyone's favorite jovial dictator



Saddam Hussein
father to many



Saddam Hussein
and all-around (not-so) good guy




Saddam Hussein
the real loser of the Iraq War



Saddam Hussein
spent half a year living in a spider hole



Saddam Hussein
went on trial, hanged



Question 1: What percentage of democratic leaders are not exiled, jailed, or killed at the end of their term?

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Question 2: What percentage of non-democratic leaders are not exiled, jailed, or killed at the end of their term?

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%
- Exiled: 3%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%
- Exiled: 23%

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%
- Exiled: 3%
- Jailed: 3%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%
- Exiled: 23%
- Jailed: 12%

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%
- Exiled: 3%
- Jailed: 3%
- Killed: 1%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%
- Exiled: 23%
- Jailed: 12%
- Killed: 7%

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%
- Exiled: 3%
- Jailed: 3%
- Killed: 1%
- Bad outcomes: 7%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%
- Exiled: 23%
- Jailed: 12%
- Killed: 7%
- Bad outcomes: 41%

Leader Fates

Democratic Leader

- Okay: 93%
- Exiled: 3%
- Jailed: 3%
- Killed: 1%
- Bad outcomes: 7%

Non-Democratic Leader

- Okay: 59%
- Exiled: 23%
- Jailed: 12%
- Killed: 7%
- Bad outcomes: 41%

Moral: If you are a non-democratic leader, you *really* don't want to get kicked out of office.

Outcome Matters

- Previously, we have only talked about “good” or “bad” outcomes and the incentive of war.
- Clearly, the *extent* of bad outcomes matters.
- Non-democratic leaders have incentive to avoid randomly fighting wars.

Imagine you are a dictator facing
a legitimate security threat.

Peace through Instability

War?

- Victory: You've done a good thing for your country.

Peace?

Peace through Instability

War?

- Victory: You've done a good thing for your country.
- Defeat: You tried to do a good thing for your country, but things went poorly.
 - Opens up coup opportunities.
 - Good chance you wind up exiled, jailed, or dead.

Peace?

Peace through Instability

War?

- Victory: You've done a good thing for your country.
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Peace?

- You did a bad thing for your country.
- But you are alive and still the dictator. Congrats!

Imagine you are a dictator and
you suspect some of your military
brass is plotting a coup.

Fighting for Survival

War?

Peace?

- You're screwed!

Fighting for Survival

War?

- Victory: You did a bad thing for your country, but it worked out well.
 - Coup unlikely to muster support.

Peace?

- You're screwed!

Fighting for Survival

War?

- Victory: You did a bad thing for your country, but it worked out well.
 - Coup unlikely to muster support.
- Defeat: You did a terrible thing for your country.
 - But coup plotters are dead or had to attempt the coup before they were ready.

Peace?

- You're screwed!

Domestic frictions can cause dictators to fight, but only when they believe they are in trouble otherwise.