

Military Alliances & Coalitions

or: I get by (with a little help from my friends)

PSC 106, Spring 2015

April 6, 2015

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

- Bargaining model of war

Recall

- Bargaining model of war
- Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war

Recall

- Bargaining model of war
- Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war
- In recitation, relaxed assumption of constant power

- Bargaining model of war
- Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war
- In recitation, relaxed assumption of constant power
- With this, the model (sometimes) produces preventive war

- What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing?

- What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing?
- Model assumes only two players

- What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing?
- Model assumes only two players
- What if there were more?

Today's question:

How does the behavior of third parties influence the prospects for war and peace?

- Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation)

- Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation)
- Also influence distribution of information

- Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation)
- Also influence distribution of information
- Early IR scholars focused on balancing vs. bandwagoning, never settled on overall effects of alliances

- Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways

- Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways
- Today, focus on two means of third party involvement:

- Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways
- Today, focus on two means of third party involvement:
 - Alliances

- Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways
- Today, focus on two means of third party involvement:
 - Alliances
 - Coalitions

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

Military Alliances

- Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states
- A type of international institution
- Differ in scope, commitments, membership

Military Alliances

- Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states
- A type of international institution
- Differ in scope, commitments, membership

Military Alliances

- Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states
- A type of international institution
- Differ in scope, commitments, membership

Common Provisions

- Defense pact
- Offense pact
- Neutrality pact
- Consultation agreement

Common Provisions

- Defense pact
- Offense pact
- Neutrality pact
- Consultation agreement

Common Provisions

- Defense pact
- Offense pact
- Neutrality pact
- Consultation agreement

Common Provisions

- Defense pact
- Offense pact
- Neutrality pact
- Consultation agreement

Let's play name that alliance!





NATO

- 1949-present, 28 members

- 1949-present, 28 members
- Highly formalized

- 1949-present, 28 members
- Highly formalized
- Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium

- 1949-present, 28 members
- Highly formalized
- Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium
- Defense pact provisions (Article 5)





SEATO

- 1954-1977, 8 states

- 1954-1977, 8 states
- Philippines & Thailand only SEA states

- 1954-1977, 8 states
- Philippines & Thailand only SEA states
- No specific troop requirements

- 1954-1977, 8 states
- Philippines & Thailand only SEA states
- No specific troop requirements
- Goal to block communism





CSTO (1992-present)

- 1992-present, 6 member states

- 1992-present, 6 member states
- Emerged from post-Soviet states

- 1992-present, 6 member states
- Emerged from post-Soviet states
- Non-Aggression & Defense Pact provision

- 1992-present, 6 member states
- Emerged from post-Soviet states
- Non-Aggression & Defense Pact provision
- Counterpart to NATO







United Nations Space Command

UN Space Command

- Not a real alliance

UN Space Command

- Not a real alliance
- From Halo video game series

UN Space Command

- Not a real alliance
- From Halo video game series
- Mistakenly used by BBC news in coverage of Syria



- Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes
- Important caveat: anarchy still applies
- Contracts must be self-enforcing
- Alliances are a special case of International Institutions

- Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes
- Important caveat: anarchy still applies
- Contracts must be self-enforcing
- Alliances are a special case of International Institutions

- Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes
- Important caveat: anarchy still applies
- Contracts must be self-enforcing
- Alliances are a special case of International Institutions

- Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes
- Important caveat: anarchy still applies
- Contracts must be self-enforcing
- Alliances are a special case of International Institutions

Formal alliances only describe part of the picture

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

Military Coalitions

- Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband

Military Coalitions


- Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband
- Ad-hoc

Military Coalitions

- Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband
- Ad-hoc
- Informal, in contrast to alliances

Example: Iraq War





“Coalition of the Willing”

- Canada, a NATO ally, is nowhere to be seen

- Canada, a NATO ally, is nowhere to be seen
- Moldova, not a formal ally, contributed

- Iraq War demonstrates an important point:
 - Alliances do not imply intervention
 - Intervention does not imply alliance
 - Strategic interaction is, as usual, important

- Iraq War demonstrates an important point:
- Alliances do not imply intervention
- Intervention does not imply alliance
- Strategic interaction is, as usual, important

- Iraq War demonstrates an important point:
- Alliances do not imply intervention
- Intervention does not imply alliance
- Strategic interaction is, as usual, important

- Iraq War demonstrates an important point:
- Alliances do not imply intervention
- Intervention does not imply alliance
- Strategic interaction is, as usual, important

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

Deterrence

- When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action

Deterrence

- When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action
- Involvement of alliance or coalition partners can enhance deterrence

Deterrence

- When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action
- Involvement of alliance or coalition partners can enhance deterrence
- Example: Craigslist

- Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby

Craigslist

- Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby
- You find a great deal for one on craigslist

- Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby
- You find a great deal for one on craigslist
- Agree to travel alone to an abandoned parking garage to carry out the transaction

- Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby
- You find a great deal for one on craigslist
- Agree to travel alone to an abandoned parking garage to carry out the transaction
- The seller wrestles your wallet away, escaping with your cash and the collectible

- Suppose you bring a friend

- Suppose you bring a friend
- Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter

- Suppose you bring a friend
- Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter
- Upon arrival the seller realizes that if they attempt to rob you, your friend is likely to intervene

- Suppose you bring a friend
- Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter
- Upon arrival the seller realizes that if they attempt to rob you, your friend is likely to intervene
- So, the presence of a third party deters the attack

Alliances deter aggression

- Third party states can play the role of an MMA fighter friend

Alliances deter aggression

- Third party states can play the role of an MMA fighter friend
- By threatening to punish an attacker, allies can cause peace through deterrence

- If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked?

- If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked?
- Deterrence only works when threats are **credible**

- If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked?
- Deterrence only works when threats are **credible**

- If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked?
- Deterrence only works when threats are **credible**
- Credible threats are ones that the threatener is willing and able to carry out

- So far, credible third-party threats encourage peace

- So far, credible third-party threats encourage peace
- Unfortunately, this isn't always the case

Overview

- Bargaining model redux
- Alliances
- Coalitions
- Deterrence
- Moral Hazard

Moral Hazard

- Describes a situation when one actor takes an action that shields another actor from the costs of risky behavior, and is unable to monitor that risky behavior

Moral Hazard

- Describes a situation when one actor takes an action that shields another actor from the costs of risky behavior, and is unable to monitor that risky behavior
- This causes the second actor to take on more risk they would otherwise

Classic Example: Insurance

- When I first bought my laptop, I did not have insurance for it

Classic Example: Insurance

- When I first bought my laptop, I did not have insurance for it
- I was very careful to not spill anything on it

Classic Example: Insurance

- Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop

Classic Example: Insurance

- Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop
- With insurance, I am much less careful

Classic Example: Insurance

- Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop
- With insurance, I am much less careful
- #YOLO (You Only Laptop Once)

Classic Example: Insurance

- Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop
- With insurance, I am much less careful
- #YOLO (You Only Laptop Once)
- By shielding me from the cost of losing my laptop, insurance encourages me to behave in a more risky manner

Conflict Initiation

- If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out

Conflict Initiation

- If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out
- As a result, states expecting assistance behave more aggressively

Conflict Initiation

- If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out
- As a result, states expecting assistance behave more aggressively
- Moral hazard can increase the probability of war

With friends like these...

- Third parties face a serious problem

With friends like these...

- Third parties face a serious problem
- They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence

With friends like these...

- Third parties face a serious problem
- They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence
- But don't want to write “blank checks,” to avoid moral hazard

With friends like these...

- Third parties face a serious problem
- They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence
- But don't want to write “blank checks,” to avoid moral hazard
- This means that communication difficulties that Fearon described extend to relations among allies as well

With friends like these...

- Third parties face a serious problem
- They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence
- But don't want to write “blank checks,” to avoid moral hazard
- This means that communication difficulties that Fearon described extend to relations among allies as well
- One (potential) answer is to build formal alliances

Deterrence vs Moral Hazard

- Third parties have competing effects

Deterrence vs Moral Hazard

- Third parties have competing effects
- Which one dominates?

Deterrence vs Moral Hazard

- Third parties have competing effects
- Which one dominates?
- Empirical evidence that design of formal alliances matters

- ATOP data project

- ATOP data project
- Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier

- ATOP data project
- Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier
- Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28%

- ATOP data project
- Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier
- Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28%
- Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47%

- ATOP data project
- Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier
- Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28%
- Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47%
- Recent research shows that these effects depend upon conditionality

- ATOP data project
- Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier
- Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28%
- Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47%
- Recent research shows that these effects depend upon conditionality
- As long as contracts are self-enforcing (recall institutions), design matters

Takeaway

- Deterrence → peace

Takeaway

- Deterrence → peace
- Moral Hazard → war

Takeaway

- Deterrence → peace
- Moral Hazard → war
- Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous

Takeaway

- Deterrence → peace
- Moral Hazard → war
- Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous
- Important for states to carefully manage commitments, communication with **both enemies and allies**

Takeaway

- Deterrence → peace
- Moral Hazard → war
- Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous
- Important for states to carefully manage commitments, communication with **both enemies and allies**
- Alliance design matters