

# Cornering the Market: Optimal Governmental Responses to Competitive Political Violence

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
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
Research question: how does *potential* competition affect political violence production?

Answer: groups with no existing competition may produce high levels of violence to corner their market


Interventions to reduce violence can backfire in weird ways




## Group 1 Can Shut Out Group 2




## Group 1 Can Shut Out Group 2




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






$$\text{Corner if } c > \left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{m_2}{m_1} - \frac{m_2^2}{4m_1^2}}\right)^2$$














More groups does not imply more violence

Reducing grievances and increasing barriers to entry can counterintuitively *increase* violence

Defensive measures are super effective

Thanks!

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